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The paper will attempt to demonstrate the fundamental importance of public goods in the performance of 
any territory or economy. After discussing the concept and definition of public goods, one of the  most 
important of them (defense), will be reviewed in the context of the European Union (E.U.) as a territory.  
The EU is currently undergoing continual creation, transformation, flux and flow as it steadily constructs 
a judicial and political framework whose precise nature is still unknown. However, EU agencies are 
launching policies in the area of defense and defense industry which will most certainly be of great 
significance in the surrender of sovereignty by member states. In the context of increasingly dynamic 
European integration, European defense policy constitutes one of Europe's most important goals. 
This common defense policy is currently being implemented through Foreign Policy, Security and 
Common Defense initiatives. Typically, the governments of member states attempt to improve the 
productive fabric in the sector through the territorial organization of defense activities. Such is 
remarkably the case of the aerospace industry through the recent creation in July of 2000 of the European 
Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) which agglutinates the activities of its three founding 
firms: the German Daimler Chrysler Aerospace AG, Aerospatiale Matra, S.A. from France and Spain's 
Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. (CASA). These firms have worked together for many years on 
numerous projects and joint ventures in the area of European cooperation such as Airbus, Eurocopter, 
Eurofighter and Arianespace. 
The present paper will also discuss the case of the firm CASA, foremost in the Spanish aeronautic sector. 
Since its foundation in 1923, CASA has developed sufficient technological and productive capability to 
compete in the international aerospace design, manufacturing and maintenance markets. Territorial and 
organizational changes undergone by the firm in the process of the constitution of EADS have particular 
interest. The paper attempts to draw some conclusions as to the foreseeable consequences for the 
European territories where these firms locate and to speculate on the influence these consequences may 
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1.1. Theoretical framework. 
 
Since Samuelson´s seminal work in 1955, economics has been developing the essential 
theory to scientifically analyse the existence of public goods in the society. This type of 
goods is characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption. Both traits 
clearly and worryingly distinguish public goods from the rest of market goods. If 
nobody can be excluded in consumption and the enjoyment of one person is in no way 
reduced by that of another; is it possible to think that public goods are similar to an 
inextinguishable source of wealth to satisfy human needs?  
Cost-free status of public goods has been, and it is still, one of the biggest illusions in 
society and its citizens. Due to the shortage of enough private supply of pure public 
goods, caused by the lack of incentives, public goods tend to provide “free meals” to 
individuals. However, their provision, like that of any other market goods, always 
involves a cost that somebody has to pay for. Therefore, the control and provision of 
public goods have been traditionally considered a public task, which gives a sound 
justification for the state intervention in the economy. 
Neither the number, nor the quantity of public goods is predetermined in an economy. 
Each society is responsible for enumerating which ones are to be considered public 
goods. Some are thought as pure public goods everywhere, while the public content of 
many others is more dubious. Indeed, even a football match could be socially rated as a 
public service. However, it is difficult to find any society where security and defence 
are not regarded as pure public goods. Therefore, society delimits the borderline 
between public and private goods, according to the relative importance given to each 
good or service, and deals with the consequences of these decisions. In this respect, it is 
key for society to pose the right questions, before it looks for the right answers. 
But one thing is clear, some core of public goods, those we call basic institutional goods 
are the major ingredient in the performance of any society. Free decisions of millions of 
individuals driven to obtain private goods and services should, at the same time, pursue 
and strengthen basic institutional goods. Simply put, institutional goods, when they 
grow and develop, generate more product than the resources that they use and, 
therefore, are fundamental to the construction, the progress and the stability of societies.   4 
There is no contradiction but coexistence between public and private goods. The former 
characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption, the later ruled by 
microeconomics laws. 
Romer (1986) and later Nelson and Romer (1996) used the endogenous growth model 
to clarify what types of goods exist and which their role is in the economy. According to 
this model, individuals acquire human capital whose level and accumulation rate 
determine the possibilities of any society to achieve knowledge and innovations applied 
to the productive process, and, therefore, to increase income and welfare. This human 
capital, called “wetware” by Nelson and Romer, represents the mind´s capacity to 
generate knowledge, that is to say, solutions, at least partial ones, to the fundamental 
economic problem of society: that is scarcity. By means of “wetware” (human capital), 
individuals and, by extension, the society create “hardware”, (the material embodiment 
of human capital), and “software”, that is to say, codes to interpret, use and develop 
machines (“hardware”). 
According to an alternative and more conventional classification, the economy is 
composed of four basic types of goods and services, depending on the possibilities of 
rivalry and excludability in consumption: 
1.  Rival and excludable goods, also called private goods where the consumption of one 
individual excludes any other person´s demand. 
2.  Rival but non excludable goods, traditionally known as commons, with a pre-
capitalist origin and probable source of the so called “tragedy of commons”. 
3.  Non rival and non excludable goods, called pure public goods, particularly relevant 
for this paper. 
4.  Non rival but excludable (or partially excludable) goods, especially suitable for the 
analysis of endogenous growth theory, since patents and other forms of protection of 
knowledge can foster investment in human capital and research. 
This work analyses those pure public goods that have been accepted by almost all 
societies
1. It particularly focuses on the Security and the Defence. Historically, the 
protection of the population and the territory against external enemies has been a sine 
qua non of the birth and the development of nation states. Countries and sovereignty 
have been reinforced by means of the capacity of defence against third parties. This has 
required the training of an appropriate army both in terms of people and armaments. If, 
                                                            
1 Security, Defence, Social Institutions, Law, Property Rights, Health, Education and Research.   5 
according to the historical experience, it is possible to say that the “state is defence”, 
how should be interpreted any trend that points out to debilitating this identity? 
1.2. The defence and its industry. 
Armaments industry has been historically linked to the action of government. This 
linkage is based on the public nature of defence and on the monopoly of force by the 
state, both outside the country, where other states represents an alternative to 
sovereignty, and inside the country, where citizens can be tempted by independence and 
violence. Therefore defence industry has strongly depended on governments. Public 
monopsony has predominated on the demand side, while oligopoly or monopoly, have 
characterised the supply side. The state has been very often the only consumer and 
supplier of this market due to the public nature of many of their firms
2. This situation 
has determined the features of the defence industry, where hierarchical organisations, 
closeness to power and political interference, take the place of market forces.   
Due to the public monopsony of these markets, governments have traditionally 
determined conditions of production and delivery dates; they have controlled production 
and trading licences and have established commercial relations not only depending on 
the ratio quality/price but also on strategic and political factors (Medina, 2001: 134). 
Within the firms, the lack of concern regarding production costs has inevitably led to 
overstaffed plants, paternalist labour relations and low productivity. Moreover, in public 
firms, strong class unions have influenced the management of these organisations, 
which have become hostages to the interest of politicians and unionists. 
This situation does not seem favourable to any transformation of defence firms towards 
the market. In fact, many of these firms failed in their intent to produce for civil market. 
The main reason is that any transformation requires human and financial efforts and a 
long and difficult learning process. It is, above all, a change of the rules guiding these 
firms, which involves a new governance structure, in accordance with the market where 
uncertainty is much bigger than in public hierarchies. Defence firms, distant from 
markets and used to privileged relations with power, did not suspect their governance 
structures have to be transformed. But radical exogenous changes such as need to adapt 
quick technological innovations to products and processes and the end of the cold war 
propelled the movement.    6 
1.2.1. The technological imperative of trial and error. 
It is possible to think that hierarchy, bureaucracy and proximity to power could lead 
defence firms to produce low quality goods, with backward technological content. 
However, this industry precisely stands out due to the high quality and the advanced 
knowledge incorporated into its products. The extreme competition among national 
armies and the need to equip armies with enough deterrent and destruction power 
explain why the public good that represents the defence has always counted on the 
necessary resources to equip the army with the most competitive armament, both in 
terms of quality and technological innovation. Human, financial and material resources 
generously fed European armament industry for the most part of XX century, due to the 
predominance of pre-war, war and post-war situations. Furthermore, budget for defence 
was usually beyond the real possibilities of countries, as can be observed nowadays in 
many developing countries, which suffer a situation similar to the one lived by Europe 
in the past. 
Military power requires maximum reliability in the functioning of any armament. That 
is to say, any product, from a simple bullet to the most sophisticated rocket, has to work 
perfectly. For this purpose, defence industry has to establish exhaustive quality controls 
and systematic production tests. In reality, defence industry has always used these 
methods, as its significant contribution to the history of technological progress reveals. 
These military practices and their culmination as war and destruction, paradoxically 
engender knowledge, crudely reflecting the processes of creative destruction that 
characterise many socio-economic models. The scientific method, a system of 
knowledge where learning and working processes are based on trial and error, has been 
practised in the defence industry since its beginnings. For this reason, distance from the 
market and proximity to public hierarchies have not been incompatible with quality and 
innovation capacity. 
Defence industry has had, until very recently, a marked national character. Every 
government has maintained autonomous defence industries, considered, as have been 
said above, a public good and a basis of national security and sovereignty. However, the 
technological sophistication that current armaments have achieved and the need for 
huge R&D expenses to be competitive have transformed the public nature of this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2 Even, when the consumer was a foreign country, sales should be made in agreement with the 
government, which not only took the final decision but also kept the exclusive control of patents and 
armaments     7 
industry during the last decades. Nowadays, almost no country is able to produce 
armament autonomously, and governments are increasingly promoting international 
agreements of co-operation and joint production (AFARMADE, 2000) 
1.2.2. Institutional  shock. 
The need for international co-operation and the changes caused by the end of the cold 
war have represented an earthquake for the defence industry at an international level. As 
a consequence of peace dividends, both national governments and defence industry 
drastically reduced their financial and productive capacities, leading, during the 
nineties, to a restructuring of this industry.  
The deepest effects of restructuring influenced the governance structure, both outside 
and inside defence firms. Institutional changes firstly affected the governance 
relationships between national governments and defence firms. The incapacity of the 
states to maintain the growth of armaments industries, due to the budgetary pressures to 
reduce their armed forces, implies the breakdown of the rules of the game that had 
guided this sector throughout its history. In Europe, the decrease in the domestic 
demand of armaments has intensified competitiveness in an already small market, 
accustomed to stability provided by the state. 
The relationship of defence firms with export markets has significantly changed as well. 
Despite the rigorous regulation of international armaments trade
3, currently, the industry 
of defence requires increasing export capacity in order to be efficient. This exigency 
generates an intense international competition. In this context, it is fundamental for 
defence firms to have available the most competitive and most technologically 
advanced products and, therefore, to reinforce international co-operation. 
Despite these transformations, the impact of institutional change specially affected the 
internal governance structure of firms. How could the defence industries, burdened with 
the bureaucratic mentality of their staff and whose production was not conditioned by 
costs, direct their activity towards the civil sector? 
The first attempts of diversification towards the civil activity clearly failed and led 
defence industries to restructure their staff or, even, to abandon the sector. The rules of 
the market (costs, initiative, image and information) seems to be too high obstacles for 
defence firms which require a new and different entrepreneurial governance, both inside 
and outside the firms. This change implies, above all, the transformation of the learning   8 
processes and the mental models of the individuals involved in production. In particular, 
defence industries should be able to confront the challenge of the market by means of 
the improvement and adaptation of their capacities and the creation of institutions able 
to ensure an efficient governance structure. This should be complemented with an 
adequate technological level and a flexible organisation of production that favour the 
diffusion of knowledge and the achievement of increasing returns to scale. Moreover, 
government actions should be conceived to facilitate and to foster these transformations. 
In accordance with these objectives, the European defence industries have begun a 
process of vertical concentration of the main national defence firms, which is 
subsequently giving place to a new process of international horizontal integration 
among European firms. At the same time, the EU is advancing in the design of what 
could be the institutional framework of a truly “continental public good”, the security 
and defence policy of the EU. 
1.3.  The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Since the Treaty on European Union came into force at Maastricht in November 1993, 
the CFSP has become one of the three basic pillars of the EU
4. It is the first time since 
the Treaties of Rome that Europe can make its voice heard on the international stage 
and express its position on armed conflicts and human rights. At the same time, EU has 
decided that it should be capable not only to act independently in crisis management but 
also to intervene to prevent conflict. During the past decade, the institutional and 
organisational transformation of CFSP has meant that European defence has advanced 
quickly, especially in terms of political objectives. It is plausible to think that in the near 
future strategic actions on security and defence will become strong elements in the EU 
policy. This section reviews the main agreements made in the context of the CFSP. 
The Western European Union (WEU)
5 was initially the organism responsible for setting 
in motion the CFSP. According to the Treaty of Maastricht, the WEU would assume the 
role of NATO's European pillar and would form the EU's defence component. The role 
of WEU as NATO´s European pillar was confirmed though the gradual formulation of a 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was part of the CFSP and 
covered all matters relating to European security in the framework of the NATO´s 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Nowadays, it is only possible to export to allied countries where no kind of sanction has been imposed. 
4 EU pillars are: European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice.   9 
policies. The role of WEU as a EU´s defence component was defined in 1992 when the 
WEU confirmed NATO's responsibility for collective self defence and formally decided 
to confine its operations to the “Petersberg tasks”
6: humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including 
peacemaking. 
The relationship between the EU and the WEU was problematic from the beginning of 
the Treaty on European Union. Differences in the composition of both organisms made 
co-ordination difficult, even more, taking into account that the decisions of one 
organism needed the approval of the other (Sanz, 2001: 87). These problems were 
reflected in the redaction of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, where the Treaty of 
Maastricht was revised and completed. This new Treaty on European Union insisted on 
the resolution to develop a CFSP, which included the gradual formulation of a ESDP, 
and kept the main roles of the WEU in the field of defence, anticipating, however, its 
possible integration in the EU.  
The period 1998-2001 was characterised by the rapid development of the ESDP, both in 
the creation of an autonomous action force and in the definition of its relationship with 
the NATO. 
French and British declaration at Saint Malô in December 1998 implies a radical change 
in the United Kingdom positions on security and defence that, until then, had been 
contrary to the majority of EU projects. This declaration proposed that "the Union must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO". For this purpose, EU should 
be equipped with the necessary means and structures. 
Between 1999 and 2001, European Council summits at Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice, 
Göteburg and Laeken reaffirmed EU agreement to have the necessary means and 
capabilities to intervene autonomously in “Petersberg tasks”. For this purpose, the 
Helsinki European Council set a “headline goal” that implies the EU commitment to be 
able, by the year 2003, to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, up 
to 60.000 persons capable of carrying out the full range of “Petersberg tasks”. The 
achievement of this goal, which does not involve the establishment of an European 
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 The WEU was established in 1954, evolved from the Brussels Treaty Organisation founded in 1948, by 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Luxemburg and it is the first step towards an European 
security and defence.  
6 So called after the name of the German city where the WEU Ministerial Council defined these missions.   10 
army, has been accelerated and in December 2001, the Laeken European Council 
declared the operational capability of ESDP, considering that EU was already able to 
develop some crisis management operations. 
The “headline goal” set by the European Council implied the transfer of WEU functions 
to the EU. This process was completed in the declaration during the WEU Council of 
Marseille, in November 2000. Since then, the WEU only remains responsible for the 
“Commitment to collective defence”. That is to say, the responsibility for defending any 
member country in the case of aggression. At the same time, the EU has reinforced its 
relationship with the NATO, in order to be able to develop increasingly complex 
operations, by means of consultation and co-operation arrangements, and with the UN, 
by means of the commitment to support UN crisis management operations with EU 
capabilities. 
European Council summits have been also essential to define the basic institutional 
structure of the ESDP. In 1999, Mr. Javier Solana was appointed as High 
Representative for the CFSP, responsible for assisting the European Presidency in the 
external representation of the EU, and the Council in the implementation of policy 
decisions in CFSP matters. The creation of the new permanent political and military 
structure of the EU was approved in the Nice European Council (December 2000): the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC); the Military Committee (MC) and the Military 
Staff (MS). Finally, a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management was 
created in 2000, in order to give advice on the non-military aspects of “Petersberg 
tasks”.  
Indeed, the EU has experienced a significant progress in its security and defence policy 
since the Treaty of Maastricht came into force. However, the EU is still far from the 
total operational capacity of the ESDP. In fact, the ESDP has shown little capacity of 
reaction in recent international crisis, like the wars in Kosovo and Afganistan. 
Moreover, it is accused of excessive dependency on the NATO and the US foreign 
policy. In this respect, one of the key factors to consolidate the ESDP is to develop a 
European industry of defence. In order to achieve this objective, the EU should 
overcome three kinds of problems: a- economic problems, focused on the current 
restructuring of the industry of defence; b- political problems, related to the 
transformation of a national public good into a continental one; and c- institutional 
problems, that imply the design of a new governance structure for this industry. 
     11 
1.4. Towards a European defence industry.       
The development of a European industry of defence becomes essential to the credibility 
and efficiency of the ESDP. However, advances in this respect have been, until now, 
very limited. European co-operation in defence matters still has a marked inter-
governmental character, linked to the EU and the NATO, but without representing an 
EU real responsibility (Medina, 2001:126). This situation is due, above all, to the 
traditional characteristics of the industry of defence as national public good. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the recent restructuring of this activity, the 
institutional agreements that have been signed and the political will of European 
governments to reach a complete development of the ESDP increasingly favour the 
integration of European national markets and policies. That is to say, current economic, 
institutional and political circumstances in the industry of defence could be contributing 
to EU political integration.  
The changes that have been observed in the most traditional features of the industry of 
defence and the impetus given by the ESDP to strengthen EU military capabilities, 
indeed, favour the development of a European defence sector. Nowadays, no EU 
government defends the total autonomy of armament acquisitions. In general terms, it is 
plausible to think that current situation has the basic ingredients to be able to aspire to a 
European defence conceived as a continental public good where the integration of firms 
in each defence activity could help to overcome the current fragmentation of this 
industry. Governments actions to achieve this goal have been, up to now, very timid and 
have basically consisted on the development of an institutional framework that intends 
to be the basis of European industry of defence and to facilitate the restructuring of this 
industry by means of the promotion of the processes of inter-national integration 
already initiated by the private sector. 
The institutions created to develop a European industry of defence have focused on the 
harmonisation of requirements of EU national armament acquisitions. The Conventional 
Arms Export Working Group (COARM) was formed in 1991 with the objective of co-
ordinating the national arms export policies. Since 1992, European co-operation of the 
industry of defence has been organised by means of the Western European Armament 
Group (WEAG), whose aims are to create the necessary conditions for the development 
of a European armament market and to strengthen the European defence technological 
and industrial base in order to be able to compete with US in the defence international 
market. For this purpose, the WEAG propose the harmonisation of requirements; the   12 
co-operation in R&D and the principles to guide the opening up of national defence 
markets to cross-border competition. In 1996, the WEAG promoted the creation of the 
Western European Armament Organisation (WEAO). This organism is part of the WEU 
and intends to be a predecessor of a European Armament Agency that is still awaiting 
its creation. Moreover, in 1995, the European Council established the Ad Hoc Party on 
a European Armament Policy (POLARM) responsible for the elaboration of reports and 
recommendations concerning the design of a European armament policy. Finally, the 
activity of the Organisation Cojoint de Cooperation en Matière de Armament (OCCAR) 
started in 1996, under the principles of harmonisation, cost effectiveness, competitive 
industrial base, renunciation of “juste retour”
7 and openness to other countries. This 
organism could become the starting point for the harmonisation of armament demands 
in EU countries. For this purpose, the OCCAR aims at providing more effective and 
efficient arrangements for the management of certain existing and future collaborative 
armament programmes. Currently the members of the OCCAR are France, Germany, 
Italy and United Kingdom, while Belgium, Netherlands and Spain have already applied 
for the incorporation and many other countries are interested in it. 
This institutional framework has obtained, until now, limited results. For this reason, in 
1997, EU governments acknowledged that the efforts made by the private sector to 
restructure the industry were one of the key pieces for the development of a European 
industry of defence and that, for this purpose, public action should facilitate the 
processes of concentration and co-operation among firms. In this field, the aerospace 
activity has developed pioneering public and private actions. 
1.5. The development of the European aerospace industry. 
In 1997, German, French and British governments expressed their intention to foster the 
restructuring and the integration of defence aerospace industry. In order to achieve this 
objective, these governments and the Spanish one proposed the establishment of an 
action programme to the main European aerospace firms. Airbus
8 participants 
responded to this proposal with a document on the principles that should guide the 
creation of a European defence aerospace company. These principles were based, both 
                                                            
7 The principle of renunciation to the “juste retour” implies that the members´ share is not necessarily 
equivalent to their investment. This is a fundamental principle of similar organisms like the WEAG and 
of any economic organism. Therefore, it is remarkable the relevance of this principle because, without it, 
the possibility of developing a European defence would be much more reduced.  
8 In 1967, German, French and British governments signed an agreement to jointly develop a new 
commercial jet plane, the Airbus   13 
on economic effectiveness and public support to the private initiatives (AFARMADE, 
2000: 136). 
In July 1998, German, Spanish, French, Italian, British and Swedish governments 
signed a “Letter of intentions” (LOI), where they committed themselves to support 
industrial co-operation in the aerospace activity, promoting, among other objectives, the 
guarantee of supply to any country, the exports liberalisation and the harmonisation of 
requirements. At the same time, the LOI recognised that the processes of concentration 
and merger of aerospace industry should be ruled according to the private sector 
principles, without any direct intervention of governments, whose role was limited to 
the creation of favourable conditions for the integration. Despite the negative reaction of 
some EU countries that feared they would be left aside in the development of a 
European industry of defence due to their small size, the LOI has become the 
institutional framework to foster co-operation agreements already initiated by aerospace 
firms. In particular, since 1999, concentration and mergers have significantly grown in 
this activity. Many factors explain why aerospace industry has become a pioneer in the 
integration of European defence: 
 
¾  The aerospace industry, compared to the majority of industrial activities, uses a very 
complex and advanced technology and requires high R&D expenditures – around 
14,5% of turnover in 2000 (AECMA, 2000: 19). Both traits reduce the autonomy of 
firms and promote co-operation and concentration agreements in order to be 
competitive. Furthermore, these traits convert aerospace industry in a strategic niche 
where innovations can be diffused to others industrial and defence activities. 
 
¾  Unlike other defence activities, aerospace has almost achieved a complete 
integration of military and civil production. In 2000, military sales represented 29% 
of total turnover while civil sales represented 71%, a percentage that is increasingly 
growing from the beginning of the nineties (AECMA, 2000: 9). Access to wider 
markets reinforces the interest for mergers in the activity as a means to achieve 
powerful scale economies. 
 
¾  Aerospace industry is an export-oriented activity: sales out of Europe accounted for 
52% of total sales in 2000. Although this export success is mainly driven by civil 
products, where exports accounted for 71% of sales, openness in military product is   14 
also significant, where almost 30% of sales are exports (AECMA, 2000:14). The 
necessity of international competitiveness has given an impetus to the integration of 
the European aerospace industry. 
 
¾  Finally, it is important to point out that a nationally fragmented European Aerospace 
industry is increasingly unable to compete with the US aerospace industry, whose 
restructuring had taken place at the beginning of the nineties, giving rise to the 
world leader companies in terms of turnover. 
 
The restructuring of European aerospace defence industry has followed a similar path to 
US restructuring some years before. Initially, the majority of firms remained linked to 
their country of origin due to the vertical integration of national industries. This 
happened in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden. The creation 
of national big companies was considered the first step towards a European integration 
by means of international mergers. 
This vision of the development of a European aerospace industry met its first obstacles 
in 1999. The assets of Marconi Electronic System (MES), the defence branch of the US 
company General Electric Co (GEC), were absorbed into British Aerospace (BAE), 
forming the group BAE-GEC which, at that moment, was the world third company in 
terms of turnover. The main objective of this absorption, the access to US market 
without losing the position in the European market, was criticised by other European 
firms like Deutsche Aerospace (DASA) from Germany and Thomson CSF from France 
since it disdained the project to create a European aerospace defence industry. For this 
reason, BAE-GEC was left aside in the first arrangements made to develop a horizontal 
merger between European firms that took place in 1999 through the establishment of the 
European Defence and Space Company (EADS). 
1.6. EADS: its creation and background. 
In July 2000, EADS started to quote on Frankfurt, Paris and Madrid stock exchanges. It 
integrates the aeronautic and space activities of Aerospatiale Matra SA (France), 
Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace AG (Germany) and Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA 
(Spain)
9. EADS is the first international European firm devoted to the industry of 
                                                            
9 These firms have been co-operating more than forty years in various collaboration projects and joint 
ventures in the aerospace industry, like Airbus, Eurocopter, Eurofighter and Arianspace.   15 
defence and, as its own name remarks, it aims at becoming the main European company 
in this industry. Daimler-Chrysler and the French state own each 30,2% of EADS 
capital, the Spanish holding SEPI own 5,5% while the rest of the capital, 34,1%, is 
owned by small stakeholders. 
Since its establishment, EADS has been the world third aerospace firm in terms of 
turnover, only below Boeing and Lockheed Martin from US. EADS is as well one of the 
two main international companies that construct commercial aircraft, helicopters, space-
shuttles and missiles. At the same time, it is one of the major suppliers of military 
aircraft, satellites, and military electronic. In particular, EADS is the world leader in 
commercial-shuttles; the world second firm in helicopters
10, commercial aircraft
11 and 
missiles systems; the world third firm in satellites
12 and military transport aircraft
13; and 
the world fourth firm in combat aircraft
14. 
 The initial results of EADS show the potential success of this integration of European 
aerospace firms (see table 1): between 2000 and 2001, revenues increased 27,2%; 
during the same period, the losses of the company became benefits and the capital 
expenditure grew from 1.351 millions Euros in 2000 to 2.196 millions in 2001. At the 
same time R&D expenditures significantly increased from 1.339 millions Euros to 
2.046. Together with good economic results, the creation of EADS has implied an 
increase in the number of employees of the new company. In total, the staff of the group 
augmented 15,8% between 2000 and 2001 and all national plants of the firm contributed 
to this growth (see table 2).  
  
Table 1. EADS results (millions Euros) 







Revenues 20.584  22.553  24.208  30.798 
Profit (loss)      -1.115  2.001 
Capital expenditure      1.351  2.196 
R&D expenditure      1.339  2.046 
  Source: http://www.eads.net 
 
                                                            
10 EADS owns 100% of Eurocopter. 
11 EADS owns 80% of Airbus Industry soon Airbus Integrated Company. 
12 EADS owns 75% of Astrium and 25,9% of Arianspace. 
13 EADS controls the programmes A400M, C-212, CN-235 and C-295. 
14 EADS owns 43% of Eurofighter.   16 
Table 2. Number of employees, EADS 2000-2001. 
 2000  2001 
TOTAL EMPLOYEES  88.879 102.967 
France  40.123 41.550 
Germany  36.065 38.445 
Spain  7.454 7.893 
United Kingdom  2.806 11.754 
Italy  33 767 
US  2.106 2.175 
Rest of the world  292 383 
          Source: http://www.eads.net 
 
Although EADS activity is focused on the civil sector -only 25% of total sales are from 
the military sector-, there are great hopes that the integration of firms will have a 
positive impact on European military production. At the same time, EADS is causing 
significant territorial, organisational, productive and technological changes among its 
members. This is the case of CASA
15, the last firm that joined EADS, whose experience 
could guide other European firms that aim at merging with the company in the future. 
1.7. The transformation of CASA into EADS-CASA. 
Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA), now EADS-CASA, is the most important 
firm in Spanish aerospace industry. Since its establishment in 1923, CASA has 
developed the necessary technological, productive and organisational abilities to be able 
to compete internationally in aerospace design, production and maintenance. 
The history of CASA is characterised by the predominance of the public sector, both in 
its capital and management. In 1943, the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) bought 
33% of CASA´s capital. In 1971, INI obtained the majority of CASA´s capital. This 
share augmented until 1992, when it accounted for 99,28% of the capital. However, the 
integration of CASA into EADS, in December 1999, meant the end of public control. 
Then, CASA became and associated firm to EADS in the same conditions as 
Aerospatiale Matra SA from France. 
 
                                                            
15 The information about EADS-CASA was gathered by means of personal interviews to the managers of 
the firm between September 2000 and February 2001,when the incorporation of CASA into EADS was 
taking place, as a part of an INTERREG-II research project on EU Regional Policy.    17 
The relationship of CASA with other European aerospace firms did not begin when 
CASA joined EADS. In fact, from the beginning of its activity, CASA had been 
increasingly participating in big European aerospace projects
16. Therefore, it is possible 
to talk about a process of natural integration previous to the official one. 
The process of integration forced CASA to take actions at both internal and external 
relations of the firm. Changes in the internal organisation of CASA are characterised by 
vertical integration of Spanish aerospace firms previous to the merger with EADS; and 
by division of labour and specialisation of national plants. Changes in external relations 
are related to the links of the firm with its territory, the network of subcontractors, the 
suppliers, other firms and the public sector. The economic results of CASA in terms of 
employment, sales, benefits, exports and investment (in capital, R&D and training) 
show the success of the strategies followed previous to become part of EADS. 
1.7.1. Changes in the internal organisation of CASA. 
Vertical integration.- Spain, like other European countries, experienced a process of 
vertical integration of national aerospace firms before the creation of EADS. In 1971, 
when CASA became a member of the project Airbus, the Spanish firm absorbed 
Hispano Aviación SA (HASA). During the nineties, the process of vertical integration 
quickened its pace. CASA merged with two of the largest Spanish aerospace firms, 
Compañía Española de Sistemas Aeronáuticos (CESA) -whose main activities were 
design, production, standardisation, tests and support services to the products, 
maintenance and repair of aircraft accessories- and Aeronáutica Industrial (AISA) -
devoted to the design, production and maintenance of aircraft. From 1989, when CESA 
was created, 60% of its capital had belonged to CASA while, since 1995, CASA has 
been the only shareholder of AISA, established in 1923.  
 
Division of labour according to big projects.-  CASA becomes EADS-CASA due to its 
integration into EADS in 1999, and, consequently, becomes a member of the European 
projects Airbus, Eurofighter, Airbus Military and Arianespace. As a consequence of this 
transformation, CASA was restructured in four divisions:  
 
                                                            
16 For example, CASA engaged in the project Airbus in 1971, when the Spanish government joined an 
agreement that had been signed in 1969 by other European aerospace firms. In 1992, CASA had already 
supplied more than one thousand rudders to Airbus.   18 
1.  Military transport aircraft division, responsible for the production of transport 
aircraft C212, C235 and G95, and combat aircraft like the Eurofighter, with a 13% 
share of EADS-CASA, that produces the right wing of the aircraft and composite 
materials of carbon fibre
17. 
   
2.  Airbus division, dedicated to the design, development and production of various 
structural components of Airbus models, with a 4% share in the Airbus Military and 
a 10% share in the Airbus Civilian. Furthermore, EADS-CASA is participating, 
with other Airbus members, in the pre-launch activities of the A3XX, a 530/570-
seat commercial aircraft. 
   
3.  Aeronautics division, whose main activities are the maintenance and modernisation 
of aircraft (F18, P3 Orion) and the production of carbon fibre aero-structures for 
other firms, airframe sections, aircraft gates and landing gearboxes. 
 
4.  Space division, responsible for the production of satellites, launchers and parts of 
Hispasat and Arianspace. 
 
Specialisation of national plants.- Eight over more than ninety manufacturing plants of 
EADS in Europe -Germany, France, Spain, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Romania 
(see map 1)- are located in Spain. Three of these eight plants are located in the region of 
Madrid –the headquarters at Barajas and two manufacturing plants at Getafe and Cuatro 
Vientos; One in Toledo at Illescas and four in Andalucia –two in Sevilla and two in 
Cadiz (see map 2).  
 
 
                                                            
17 EADS-CASA has paid special attention to new materials technology (composites of carbon fibre). For 
this reason, currently, EADS-CASA has the most advanced systems and processes to design, produce, 
maintain and repair any kind of aero-structures made of these materials. In the next future, these new 
materials will account for more than 40% of military aircraft and, probably, more than 30% of civil 
aircraft.   19 
Map 1. Plants of EADS in Europe. 




Map 2. Plants of EADS in Spain   20 
 Source:  http://www.eads.net 
 
 
As mentioned above, the establishment of EADS has caused an increase in international 
competition. Even, it would be plausible to expect a “trade war” between US and 
European aerospace firms. Taking into account how international competition could 
affect the territories where EADS is located, the company has carried out a division of 
tasks, by means of the specialisation of each territory. According to the new 
organisation of EADS each manufacturing plant executes a part of the common 
activities of EADS.  This division of labour has also affected EADS-CASA: 
 
¾  EADS-CASA Headquarters and the scientific and technological research department 
are located at Barajas (Madrid), together with the development and construction of 
space products. 
 
¾  At Cuatro Vientos (Madrid), EADS is specialised in the project Eurocopter Spain 
and in helicopter maintenance. 
 
¾  The plant at Getafe (Madrid) is devoted to the engineering and system division, 
carbon fibre component development and manufacture, final assembly of combat 
aircraft, assembly of structural subassemblies and aircraft maintenance (helicopter, 
and their components and combat aircraft and their components). 
 
¾  Illescas factory (Toledo) is specialised in advanced manufactures of carbon fibre 
components. 
 
¾  At Cadiz, the activity of EADS-CASA is sheet metal technology, diffusion welding 
and superplastic shaping and helicopter component maintenance. 
 
¾  At Puerto Real (Cadiz), EADS-CASA carries out the assembly of structural 
subassemblies. 
   21 
¾  The activities of San Pablo factory (Sevilla) are final assembly and maintenance of 
transport aircraft and their components, manufacture of electrical components and 
assembly of structural subassemblies. 
 
¾  Finally, Tablada factory (Sevilla) is specialised in the integrated numerical control 
component, stretch forming and chemical milling, assembly of structural 
subassemblies, tubes and welding and launchable tanks 
1.7.2. Changes in the external relations of CASA. 
Territorial changes.- the plants of EADS-CASA keep relation with the European and 
the national markets. On the one side, the natural environment of EADS-CASA is 
Europe and the firm has a feeling of belonging to an international economic and 
territorial system, Europe. On the other side, local territory is still fundamental for the 
firm. EADS-CASA´s managers value the advantages of Madrid as national centre due 
to its infrastructure, technological climate, human capital, specialised labour market, 
good social relations and the external image of the city. Therefore, neither the 
integration into EADS nor the changes in internal organisation has reduced the 
relevance of national industrial relations to CASA. Geographic proximity remains an 
essential factor of territorial anchorage. 
Subcontracting network.- a network of industrial societies related to CASA has been 
formed around the firm throughout time. Externalisation and subcontracting are 
remarkable traits of aerospace industry. The main firm, responsible for the final product, 
often uses local subcontractors to carry out a substantial part of the production. These 
relations give rise to a network organisation, on which depends the flexibility of the 
productive system.   
EADS-CASA carries out the design and other functions previous to production, the 
production, the assembly, the finish and the packaging. However, during the integration 
of CASA into EADS, externalisation and subcontracting increased. Currently, part of 
design and other functions previous to production, the production itself and the 
assembly are subcontracted. On average, 12% of total sales -a higher percentage than in 
1997- is subcontracted or externalised. Subcontractors, many of them small and medium 
enterprises, are located in the regions of Madrid, Sevilla and La Rioja. Furthermore, 
these firms have experienced qualitative changes due to their relation with EADS, since   22 
EADS-CASA only subcontracts those firms with proven certificates of quality and 
standardisation. 
In parallel with the expansion of subcontracting, EADS-CASA is increasingly working 
as subcontractor itself, providing aerostructures, wings, tails and tanks. For this reason, 
EADS-CASA has all the necessary certificates of quality and standardisation. On 
average, 40% of its production is for other firms (half of this percentage as risk capital 
partner of Airbus). Moreover, international aeronautic firms, like Boeing, order the 
design and production of aircraft components to EADS-CASA.  
 
Suppliers.- The relations of EADS-CASA with the suppliers of raw materials, 
machinery, components and accessories have changed as well. The majority of these 
suppliers are Spanish firms, located in the regions of Madrid, Castilla la Mancha, La 
Rioja, Andalucía, Cataluña y el País Vasco. However, EU and international suppliers 
are increasingly growing. At the same time, collaboration within EADS has allowed 
CASA to develop its own services. Technical and technological attendance, design, 
education, accounting and marketing are totally internalised. Software is developed 
between CASA and other firms from Madrid and EU. Only publicity and transportation 
are externalised. The former partially ordered within Madrid territory and the later, in 
Madrid and the areas where plants are located. 
Co-operation relations.- co-operation between EADS-CASA and other firms and 
organisations has increased. The integration into EADS has facilitated the participation 
in projects, the obtaining of funds and the exchange of ideas and information. Currently, 
the objectives of this co-operation are focused, above all, on the development of new 
products and new production processes. EADS-CASA not only co-operates with rest of 
EADS but also with other Spanish and foreign firms. For example, EADS-CASA 
transfers technology to other companies through its specialised staff; also with the right 
to use its inventions (like in Chile and Indonesia
18); or through consultancy services and 
R&D carried out for non-European firms. At the same time, EADS-CASA also 
collaborates with the Spanish central government -in particular with the ministries of 
defence, science and technology and foreign affairs; with the regional governments and 
the city councils in the areas where manufacturing plants are located; with universities 
                                                            
18 In 1973, CASA signed an industrial collaboration agreement with Indonesia in order to produce and 
commercialise C-212. In 1979, CASA and IPTN from Indonesia decided to develop a transport light 
aircraft, CN-235.    23 
and public research centres, like the Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aerospacial  (INTA); 
and with unions and professional  associations. Co-operation with the public sector 
basically takes place at a national level, although EADS-CASA is increasingly 
achieving agreements with EU governments. 
1.8. Performance of CASA before its integration into EADS. 
CASA´s performance has improved as its participation in big European aerospace 
projects increased, up to become a part of EADS. Currently, more than 70% of the total 
turnover of CASA and the other two founder members of EADS comes from the 
common activities of the new company. 
Total sales grew from 834,877 millions Euros in 1995 to 1,248,518 millions in 1999, 
last year of the firm´s autonomy. Around 70% of these sales came from the civil market, 
while 30% from the military one. The profits of CASA in 1999 -close to 3% of total 
sales- were also bigger than in 1995. These results are based on the increase of 
exchanges, both within EADS and with the EU governments. Exports account for 
89,1% of CASA´s sales in 1998 (Ministerio de Defensa, 1999) while exports achieved 
between 40% and 60% of sales by means of intra-firm trade
19 in1999. In this year, 
CASA gained access to new markets, particularly in the EU, attracting new clients, 
generally from the public sector. Moreover, investment also increased significantly, 
mainly focused on R&D for the development of new products and processes. This type 
of investment almost doubled from 1996 (108.464 millions Euros) to 1999 (180.423 
millions ). In the same period, investment in capital grew as well from 8.311 millions 
Euros to 91.293 millions.  
The creation of EADS has brought and will bring a restructuring of the personnel 
which, in general terms, decreased. In 2000, EADS-CASA had 816 employees less than 
CASA in 1995 (see table 3). Redeployments of labour force were caused by the 
shrinkage of administrative staff and semi-qualified and non-qualified workers, while, 
at the same time, the number of managers, engineers, technicians and qualified workers 
grew. In 2000, 1.192 of CASA´s employees had a university degree, and around 1.000 
employees (13,5% of the staff) participated in R&D activities. In order to optimise the 
staff, the integration into EADS obligated CASA to reduce the number of non-qualified 
workers and to contract highly qualified employees. In the short term, new and highly 
                                                            
19 Exports significantly vary from one year to the other, because external sales strongly depend on the 
contracts derived from international projects.   24 
qualified human resources should be incorporated into EADS-CASA, since the majority 
of managers and R&D staff are over fifty years old. In this respect, it is expected that 
the firm will contract young and qualified employees and will develop the French model 
to manage the staff, which is considered one of the most advanced models of 
organisation within the industry. Several training initiatives were taken in order to deal 
with the necessity of more qualified staff. Between 1997 and 2000, CASA devoted 
4.970 millions Euros to training. These resources were used for continuous education as 
well as offering training courses in its own technical school when workers are 
contracted. 
In sum, the integration of financial and productive capital in the creation of a company 
like EADS has favoured the recent results of CASA. Above all, this process has 
encouraged commercial exchanges (of intermediate and final goods) among the member 
firms and with the governments of the countries where the plants of EADS are located. 
The transformation of the European aerospace industry not only affects European 
cohesion in connection to the ESDP, but also accompanies and reinforces the global 
process of EU formation and integration. Therefore, this change could contribute to 
accelerate political integration, the last step of present Europe.  
 
 















Total   8.185 7.369  4.558  1.897 776 138 
Managers  40 150  137  10 3 0 
Engineers  1.737 1.790  1.502 199  83  6 
Technicians  1.201 1.409  826 445 125  13 
Administrative staff  1.773 1.180  786 264 122  8 
Workers          
     Qualified  2.590 2.656  1.216 905 428 107 
     Semi-qualified  721  79  28 34 13  4 
     Non-qualified  120 105  63  40 2 0 
  Source:  Author. 
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1.9. Conclusions. 
The transformation of European aerospace industry exhibits a change in the conception 
of European defence, which involves higher regional integration. It is confirmed that the 
traditional link between the states and their defence, conceived as a national public 
good, is weakening and giving rise to the formation of a common defence, conceived as 
a continental public good. In this process, it is possible to begin to see how the creation 
of European companies, located in the territory of various countries, like EADS, could 
stimulate the birth of a new political entity.  
Such a transformation is not immediate. On the contrary, it is a long process that 
involves deep political, institutional and economic changes. From a political point of 
view, states have accepted to renounce to a part of their sovereignty, and have proposed, 
by means of the ESDP, the institutional and organisational framework that could 
become the seed of a European army. At the same time, recent initiatives in the industry 
of defence, where aerospace activity is pioneer, tend to reinforce institutional and 
political agreements, by means of a growing integration of firms, guided by the 
principles of market economy. 
Indeed, this process is just starting. Although the ESDP has achieved notorious 
advances and the increasing integration of aerospace industry, by means of the creation 
of EADS, has opened a promising path, European defence is still closely related to 
national states. The existence of a European army and a common defence is not only 
faraway but also full of obstacles that should not be forgotten: 
•  European defence is still very dependent on NATO and US and will have serious 
problems to achieve its autonomy. In fact, US, that supports the creation of a 
common defence linked to the NATO, has already expressed its reserves on the 
project of formation of a European defence industry independent from US (Olivé, 
2001: 148). 
•  One of the main reasons for US reserves is based on the integration and co-
operation agreements that currently link European and US defence firms. Strategies 
of integration with US firms, like BAE´s strategy, are plausible alternatives to the 
arrangements among European firms and are regarded as a menace for the 
establishment of a European armament market. It is still difficult to see how to 
harmonise these types of agreements in a world market that is increasingly open and 
where technological collaboration becomes a need.   26 
 
•  European demand for armament is not yet unified. In the defence industry, the 
process of European integration has begun on the supply side. One of the most 
important and complex steps to achieve a common defence will be the unification of 
the demand of all European ministries of defence and the consequent loss of 
sovereignty that it involves. 
•  The integration of European defence industry could find the opposition of some 
firms and countries which feel that they have been left aside from integration and 
co-operation agreements, as happened in 1998, after the declaration of the LOI. In 
this respect, the ESDP should try to create the favourable conditions for broad 
international mergers, specially taking into account the firms of those countries that 
aspire to join EU. 
•  As has been mentioned above, the productive activity of European defence industry 
has two territorial levels that are compatible between them. On the one side, 
international integration and co-operation agreements among the biggest national 
firms in each activity; on the other side, subcontracting relations with the local 
network of small and medium enterprises of each country. In principle, this key role 
played by the territory in the productive relations of the manufacturing plants of 
Europeans defence companies, does not seem to be a significant obstacle for the 
integration of the different national industries of defence. However, the relevance of 
territory shows that part of defence activity will maintain a marked national 
character. 
•  Finally, it is plausible to ask to what extent the rapid process of integration that has 
taken place in the aerospace industry around EADS is an exception or could be 
repeated in less advanced defence activities, like the production of tanks and 
munitions, where the pace of international mergers could be slower because the 
technological imperative for integration is weaker.        
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